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1. Law vs. Philosophy at the Core of Kant’s Conflict
The last book Kant completed without assistance, The Conflict of the Fac-
ulties (1798), is typically regarded as a mere composite of three essays on
separate themes held together with nothing but an artificial appeal to the
four-fold structure of the Prussian university. As we shall see below, the
three parts of Conflict examine the relationship between philosophy
and the three “higher” faculties of the university. Or so, at least, he claims
in his Introduction.
In fact, only Part I of Conflict, on the relation between the faculties of
philosophy and theology, really lives up to this stated purpose. Instead of
writing new and original works for the other two parts, Kant adapted es-
says he had written previously, probably with other uses originally in
mind. Especially the essay appearing as the Second Part, entitled “An
old question raised again: Is the human race constantly progressing?”
(hereafter “OQ”), seems at first to have little or no serious relevance to
the issue of a philosopher’s duty with regard to both the faculty of law
in general and the challenge to build a more peaceful world in particular.
While both the form and the content of “OQ” undoubtedly leave some-
thing to be desired, I believe it offers more insight into the “official” topic
(i. e. , the relation between the philosophy faculty and the faculty of law)
than meets the eye.
In order to appreciate the full significance of “OQ”, we must first
look at its immediate context in Kant’s philosophical corpus. Kant orig-
inally drafted the essay roughly three years before it was published, so it
should not be surprising that the most relevant context is its relationship
to a work Kant published around the same time: Perpetual Peace (1795).
In many ways, the latter applies the same reasoning to the topic of inter-
national relations that Conflict applies to the structure of a university’s
faculties. I shall therefore begin here by exploring certain elements in Per-
petual Peace that clarify the relevance of what Kant goes on to write about
lawyers and philosophers in the Second Part of Conflict.
2. The “Secret Article” in Perpetual Peace:
Irony or Transcendental Condition?
The main principles of Perpetual Peace are well known, for this is prob-
ably the greatest (and certainly the most widely read) of the works Kant
wrote to supplement his systematic writings. After a brief and rather iron-
ic introduction asking the reader to take him seriously despite the appa-
rently impracticable nature of his claims, Section I identifies six “prelimi-
nary” requirements any states must follow in order to set in motion a last-
ing peace in their relations with other states.1 These are meant to be prin-
ciples of self-regulation that states can begin to implement on their own,
even before there is an international “federation of states”, whose task
would be to make perpetual peace a reality. Section II then explains
the three “definitive articles” that would need to be adopted by every
member state. Each state must: (1) establish a “Republican” Constitution,
whereby the government bases its mode of administration on a “separation
of the executive power (the administration) from the legislative”, so that
the people who make the laws are not the same as the people who enforce
the laws;2 (2) uphold a body of international law enacted by the Feder-
ation, so that states no longer relate to each other in the uncivilized man-
ner of lawless savages, but according to self-determined principles of “ra-
tional freedom;”3 and (3) foster “Universal Hospitality”, so that all
1 See ZeF, AA 08: 343–347; tr. Lewis White Beck in On History, ed. Lewis White
Beck (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963).
2 ZeF, AA 08: 352. Any government that allows the ones who make the laws also
to administer them is necessarily despotic, even if the despotism is hidden under
the cloak of a popular, democratic vote. Democracy without separation of powers
(i. e. , non-republican democracy) is despotic because “‘all’ decide for or even
against one who does not agree; that is, ‘all’, who are not quite all, decide,
and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom”.
3 ZeF, AA 08: 354 f. Among the most fundamental principles of international law
is that the federation’s purpose cannot be that of establishing “a law of nations as
a right to make war” (356). Kant goes on (357): “The only conceivable meaning
of such a law of nations [i. e. , as a right to make war] might be that it serves men
right who are so inclined that they should destroy each other and thus find per-
petual peace in the vast grave that swallows both the atrocities and their perpe-
trators.”
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human beings will be regarded as “world citizens” with the same basic
rights, including “a right of temporary sojourn” in other countries with-
out being treated as enemies (ZeF, AA 08: 358).
Although Kant’s basic argument appears to be complete at this point,
some of his most interesting ideas appear in the two Supplements and
two Appendices that follow. These sections are also where we find the
most interesting common ground between Perpetual Peace and “OQ”.
The First Supplement, for example, is a lengthy analysis of the progress
of the human race toward the goal of obtaining the kind of lasting
peace between nations that is envisioned in the main part of the book.
Here Kant argues that nature implements a four-stage “mechanism”
that guarantees the goal of peace will eventually be reached. In the earliest
stage of human history, hostility between different groups of people serves
the necessary purpose of encouraging them to spread throughout the
whole earth. As the earth begins to fill up with people, those living in
the same area must establish laws and create civilizations for their own
self-protection; but as a result, conflicts arise with neighboring civiliza-
tions, and war is the inevitable result. The third stage begins when some-
one (like Kant) realizes that, in order for peace to exist in spite of the dif-
ferences that have arisen during this process (especially differences in lan-
guage and religion), a federation of separate nations must be established.
(We are currently living in this third stage, though perhaps not much fur-
ther along than we were 200 years ago.) Finally, as the idea of “world cit-
izenship” becomes more and more prominent, with different civilizations
recognizing that peace despite our conflicting ideals really is in everyone’s
best interests, the goal of perpetual peace will be realized.
The Second Supplement, unlike the First, is brief and appears to be of
questionable practical value. Yet it is of crucial importance when assessing
the relation between Perpetual Peace and “OQ”. Kant here introduces a
so-called “Secret Article” that he claims must be present “subjectively”
in any legislation that is to succeed in leading the world’s nations along
the road to perpetual peace. By this he means the lawyers who draft leg-
islation must have this article in mind, and employ it in practice, even
though it is not “objectively” part of any state Constitution or body of
international law (ZeF, AA 08: 368). The secret article states: “The opin-
ions of philosophers on the conditions of the possibility of public peace
shall be consulted by those states armed for war”. Although few take Kant
very seriously at this point, I believe this is an absolutely crucial part of his
plan for enduring world peace. It is essential because if those who draft
legislation depend solely on the objective articles, the path to peace will
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be devoid of what we might call the transcendental conflict that Kant views
as a necessary condition for real peace. That is, legislators must be open to
having their opinions challenged, analyzed, and subjected to the judg-
ment of dispassionate reason by those with expertise in the latter, or
else their legislation, drafted in a context devoid of creative conflict,
will fail to establish the desired goal of peace.4 Unlike Plato, Kant does
not think “kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings;”
rather, he only asks the faculty of law to be willing to give the faculty
of philosophy a fair hearing. Here Kant is hinting at what will turn
out to be a central point in Conflict: the ideal of peaceful conflict within
the university is our most effective model for making real progress on the
path toward perpetual peace between nations.
Appendix I expounds further on the necessary opposition, or conflict,
between politics and morality, at least as regards their different functions
on the path to peace. Politicians, Kant argues, tend to be immoral because
of the relationship they inevitably have to those holding power (ZeF, AA
08: 373): “they flatter the power which is then ruling so as not to be re-
miss in their private advantage, and they sacrifice the nation and, possi-
bly, the whole world”. In direct contrast to philosophers, politicians
“make a great show of understanding men […] without understanding
man and what can be made of him, for they lack the higher point of
view of anthropological observation which is needed for this”.5 Kant con-
cludes that, although “objectively […] there is no conflict between morals
and politics” (ZeF, AA 08: 379), the reality of human selfishness and evil
necessitates that “[s]ubjectively […] this conflict will always remain”.
Perpetual Peace concludes in Appendix II with an explanation of how
“the transcendental concept of public right” can be used to establish har-
mony “between morality and politics” – the necessary condition for last-
ing peace. Here Kant proposes a “transcendental condition of public law
(ZeF, AA 08: 381): ‘All actions relating to the right of other men are un-
4 Objective legislation made without the controlling conflict of the philosopher’s
voice echoing in the subjective background will never lead to world peace, be-
cause on their own, lawyers always tend to look after their own self interests ;
the lawyer “throws the sword of justice” into “the scales of right” whenever
“the scale does not sink the way he wishes” (ZeF, AA 08: 369).
5 ZeF, AA 08: 374. Kant cites three rather cynical (though all too often, penetrat-
ingly accurate !) maxims guiding the typical professional at law. He then challeng-
es us to stand up and courageously fight against this feature of modern culture
(376): “Let us […] force the false representatives of power to confess that they
do not plead in favor of the right but in favor of might”.
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just if their maxim is not consistent with publicity’”. After discussing sev-
eral examples of this merely “negative” principle, Kant warns that “we
cannot infer conversely that the maxims which bear publicity are there-
fore just”, because those who wield sufficient levels of power have little
need to conceal their plans, whether they are good or not (385). The af-
firmative version of this transcendental principle is (386): “‘All maxims
which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree
with politics and right [i. e. , morality] combined”. Careful attention to
Kant’s arguments in the Supplements and Appendices reveals that, if
Kant’s plan for perpetual peace between nations is ever to become a reality
on earth, then a context must exist wherein philosophers are not only “al-
lowed” but encouraged to engage in open conflict with legal professionals,
through peaceful public discussion of universal principles relevant to ac-
tual legislation. In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that Kant’s
task in “OQ” was to show that such a context already exists, in the
form of the university.
3. Conflict between the Philosophy and Law Faculties
as the Model for Perpetual Peace
Our brief overview of Kant’s masterpiece on peace provides a helpful con-
textualization for understanding the significance of the essay he was writ-
ing around the same time, “OQ”. For what Kant only hints in the Second
Supplement to Perpetual Peace, that progress toward peace may depend
on philosophers (especially academic philosophers) acting almost as
spies (or “secret agents”) in the political realm, comes to look more like
a serious contender for a transcendental condition for the empirical rea-
lization of international peace. In “OQ” Kant offers a philosophical in-
terpretation of the actual structure of the Prussian university system, por-
traying it as a vehicle for promoting just the sort of open public conflict
between philosophers and various types of professionals that his previous
work had treated as a “subjectively necessary” (i. e. , transcendental?) con-
dition for peace.
The universities of Kant’s day had a far simpler structure than our
contemporary universities typically do. Instead of a seemingly endless
array of departments grouped into a smaller but still indeterminate num-
ber of faculties, the whole system consisted of four faculties divided into
two types. The three higher faculties – theology, law, and medicine – were
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charged with the task of training the professionals (i. e. , priests, lawyers,
and doctors) whose task was to assist the public in solving problems re-
lating to their moral/spiritual well-being, their property, and their health,
respectively. Philosophy was called the lower faculty because its job was
not to train professionals but to educate, examine, and if necessary, chas-
ten all the other faculties in matters pertaining to reason. Kant’s book is
divided into three parts, devoted (at least in theory) to an explanation of
how the philosophy faculty engages in creative conflict with each of the
three higher faculties.
Kant’s assumption was that this ideal of peaceful yet creative conflict
in an academic setting can make a difference to the general public, while
causing them no harm, because the arguments of the philosophers can
and should change the way priests, lawyers, and doctors deal with the
public. An important difference between the lower and higher faculties,
however, concerns the role of government regulation – an issue Kant
deals with only incidentally throughout Conflict. Because the content
taught and published by members of the higher faculties has a direct in-
fluence on those professionals who deal immediately with the public, the
government has a responsibility to regulate what these faculties teach; the
philosophy faculty, by contrast, does not train professionals and therefore
should not have to answer to any authority other than reason. In this way,
it fulfills a crucial role in any republican state, by providing a “checks and
balances” system from within the state-sponsored educational system it-
self. When its potential is fully realized, academic debate can not only ex-
emplify the kind of healthy conflict that has the potential to make society
a wiser and safer place to live; it can also actually bring about the goal of
peace through its indirect effect on the general public.
Unfortunately, Kant’s stated plan for Conflict was more of an ideal-
ized hope than an accurate account of what he actually wrote therein.
For the only part that fully accords with his stated goal is Part I, on
the theology faculty. The other two parts only tangentially touch on
the specific issue of conflict between philosophers and the relevant profes-
sionals (i. e. , lawyers or doctors). As a result of this defect in the compo-
sition of Kant’s book, perhaps excusable due to his old age at the time of
publication, the only detailed explanation of how empirical conflict in an
academic setting can pave the way for peace is to be found in his account
of the relationship between philosophers and theologians.
The theology faculty, Kant argues, adopts a wholly different stand-
point from the philosophy faculty. Members of the two faculties are, in
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many respects, enemies or “warring neighbors”.6 This is because the
source of the theology faculty’s authority is its appeal to divine revelation.
The Word of God (i. e. , the Holy Scripture of whatever religious tradi-
tion is being taught), and the Spirit of God (i. e. , the presence of
God’s voice in the interpreter’s heart, leading him or her to formulate
the right interpretation) are the fundamental basis for all consideration,
both theoretical and practical. By contrast, the philosophy faculty’s au-
thority is grounded in reason alone. Because theologians must inevitably
make use of reason whenever they interpret or apply the statements they
find in Scripture, they are necessarily subject to the philosopher’s critical
analysis. Conversely, philosophers may offer interpretations and applica-
tions of Scriptural statements without subjecting themselves to orthodox
doctrinal restrictions; being philosophers, they never need to step outside
their role as messengers of reason. Since this paper is not about religion
and theological conflicts but about politics and how philosophers can
help perpetuate peace, this brief summary of Part I must suffice.7
In applying the same principle of free and open (i. e. , unregulated, yet
peaceful) conflict to the academic philosopher’s interactions with the fac-
ulty of law, Kant should have argued explicitly that the philosopher’s task
is to provide a universal, rational standpoint for assessing and improving
actual empirical legislation. Instead, “OQ” deals only with the far more
limited issue of whether “the human race [is] constantly progressing”.8
Our overview of Perpetual Peace showed that this same issue was also
the focus of the First Supplement in that work. We must therefore
keep in mind that such progress was crucial to determining the potential
success of Kant’s overall political vision. If the human race is not progress-
ing, then the philosopher has no reason even to try to be a secret agent for
peace.
A few of Kant’s arguments in the Second Part of Conflict can be ap-
plied fairly easily to the university setting. For example, when he explains
how the future of human history can be known a priori by noting such
6 Kant uses such a territory metaphor in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,
Preface.
7 But see my book, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspec-
tives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), especially Chapter IX, and my essay, “Philoso-
phers in the Public Square: A Religious Resolution of Kant’s Conflict”, Chap-
ter 12 in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Ste-
phen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
8 SF, AA 07: 79; tr. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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knowledge is possible “if the diviner himself makes and contrives the
events which he announces in advance” (SF, AA 07: 80), we can surmise
that this would be one of the key differences between the way the faculty
of law and the faculty of philosophy deal with legal issues. Members of
the faculty of law, strictly speaking, would have the sole task of teaching
and interpreting the given body of law, as handed down by whatever au-
thority holds sovereign power in the state (i. e. , the monarch, the aristoc-
racy, or the people as a whole). Members of the faculty of philosophy, by
contrast, would have the task of determining in advance what law reason
determines as best, and then comparing the existing body of law with this
ideal in order to assess its validity. (This is precisely what Kant did in Re-
ligion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, only as applied to the faculty of
theology. The Preface to the second edition of that work describes these
two tasks – determining in advance what rational religion should be, then
comparing one empirical religion with that ideal – as the two “experi-
ments” being conducted in that work.) Beyond this, we can infer that
Kant’s underlying intention was to suggest that perpetual peace between
nations will become a reality only when philosophers are given the right
(at least “subjectively” – i. e. , unofficially, or “in secret”) to participate
fully in the dialogue over matters of policy as well as in the character de-
velopment of politicians – e. g., through moral and philosophical educa-
tion.
Although “OQ” does not deal directly with the conflict between phi-
losophers and lawyers in the university, we may glean some important in-
sights by looking further into what Kant does say there about the issue of
world peace and its relation to different approaches to conflict. After
making the above point about foreknowledge being a form of self-fulfill-
ing prophecy, Kant goes on to compare politicians who institute laws
aimed at preventing revolt (but who thereby create the very conditions
for revolt) with preachers who “prophesy the complete destruction of re-
ligion and the imminent appearance of the Antichrist ; and in doing so
they are performing precisely what is requisite to call him up” (SF, AA
07: 80). Next, Kant proposes three possible scenarios that would make
prediction possible: the human race must either be “in continual retro-
gression toward wickedness, or in perpetual progression toward improve-
ment […], or in eternal stagnation in its present stage of moral worth
[…]”.9 He refers to the first option as “moral terrorism”, but points out
9 SF, AA 07: 81. Kant’s use of the words “continual”, “perpetual”, and “eternal”
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problems with all three options that make them equally untenable. Expe-
rience can never be a sufficient basis for solving “the problem of progress”
because human beings are free and can at any point in time act in accord-
ance with either a good or an evil disposition: what people “ought to do
may be dictated in advance, but […] it may not be predicted what they
will do […]” (SF, AA 07: 83).
Nevertheless, Kant suggests that, if a “prophetic history” is to be ad-
vanced in a philosophical manner, “some experience” must be cited as an
empirical grounding for one’s reasoning (SF, AA 07: 84). A good exam-
ple, he claims, is the public reaction in France to the revolution that had
begun in 1789; he interprets this reaction as a clear sign of two moral
causes operating in the society (SF, AA 07: 89): “first, that of the right,
that a nation must not be hindered in providing itself with a civil consti-
tution, which appears good to the people themselves; and second, that of
the end […], that that same national constitution alone be just and mo-
rally good in itself, created in such a way as to avoid, by its very nature,
principles permitting offensive war”. What reason can discern as the
“pure” (a priori) lesson to be drawn from this experience is that people
are inclined, by their inner moral nature, “to striv[e] after […] a repub-
lican constitution” (SF, AA 07: 87–88). This memorable experience “has
revealed a faculty in human nature for improvement such that no politi-
cian […] might have conjured out of the course of things hitherto exist-
ing […]”.10 On this basis, Kant advances a “philosophical prophecy”: “the
human race has always been in progress toward the better and will con-
tinue to be so henceforth”.11
Although the bulk of “OQ” does not deal very explicitly with the ac-
tual conflict between the university faculties of philosophy and law, Kant
does emphasize at one point that “public instruction of the people in its
duties and rights vis--vis the state to which they belong” constitutes
nothing less than “Enlightenment” itself (SF, AA 07: 89). He then argues
that the “free professors of law” who are “the natural heralds and expos-
provide further evidence that Kant is here dealing with essentially the same theme
he was addressing in Perpetual Peace.
10 SF, AA 07: 88. Kant’s use of the term “faculty” here refers, of course, to a power
of the mind, not to a university department. This parallel usage of the same term
does suggest, however, that a metaphorical relationship exists (or should exist) be-
tween these two organizational structures.
11 SF, AA 07: 88–89. Kant qualifies this prophetic proposition in a way that seems
to foreshadow Nietzsche’s bermensch: “provided at least that there does not, by
some chance, occur a second epoch of natural revolution which will push aside
the human race to clear the stage for other creatures […]” (89).
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itors of these” duties and rights must not be the ones “officially appointed
by the state” (i. e. , members of the faculty of law, and all the professionals
– lawyers and judges – taught by them); rather, they are “philosophers
who, precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are objectionable
to the state, which always desires to rule alone […]” (SF, AA 07: 89).
Only philosophers are fully equipped to teach “the eternal norm” (or
“Platonic ideal”) of “a constitution in harmony with the natural right
of human beings”, a norm “for all civil organization in general” that
“averts all war” (SF, AA 07: 90–91). For “the duty of the monarchs” –
and in a democratic system, the people themselves are the monarch – is
“to treat people according to principles which are commensurate with
the spirit of laws of freedom;” and philosophers, unlike the members
of the faculty of law, are able to convey this insight to the public, for
they appeal to reason as their sole authority.
4. Can Philosophers Be Secret (i. e. , Transcendental) Agents
for Peace?
Had Kant paid more attention to the stated theme of his Conflict book in
“OQ”, he surely would have said more about the disputes that will inevi-
tably arise between philosophers who attempt to take up this duty (i. e. ,
to educate the public in the true nature of law) and the legal professionals
and teachers who teach merely the status quo. Instead, the remainder of
“OQ” merely clarifies two concluding points. These points also raise
for us the concluding question of this paper: does Kant’s vision of the
philosopher as a secret agent for peace have any meaningful application
in today’s academic and political context?
First, the successful implementation of Kant’s plan – starting, we may
presume, with an openness in university law faculties to input from phi-
losophers – will give rise only to a legally better society, where people’s
external actions conform to principles of civility, without necessarily re-
quiring any change in the moral corruption of human nature; as such,
his plan must be distinguished from all utopian visions, whereby a reli-
gious revolution based on “a kind of new creation (supernatural influence)
would be necessary” (SF, AA 07: 91–92). This point coincides nicely
with the distinction Kant makes in the first Appendix to Perpetual
Peace, between the moral and political realms. Once again, we can see
how these two essays feed into each other. The philosopher as secret
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agent is not concerned so much with the moral improvement of the
human race (this would be an issue of concern only for the philosopher
who is dialoguing with the theologian), as with how we can improve the
quality of civil society, the external relations between persons and between
states.
Second, the plan can be expected to succeed only if it is implemented
“from top to bottom” – i. e. , according to “a well-weighed plan of the sov-
ereign power” – for the simple reason that if the state is not supporting
the plan, then it will have “no money left […] for the salaries of its teach-
ers who are capable and zealously devoted to their spheres of duty, since it
uses all the money for war” (SF, AA 07: 92–93). Thus, even with all the
imperfections and awkwardness of its existing form, “OQ” does provide
ample evidence to enable us to conclude that for Kant the university was
to be the primary context wherein, through the education of the public in
an approach to law that is grounded in reason, the drama of the evolution
of the human race from a random collection of warring nations to a sin-
gle, peacefully coexisting partnership of nations with radically conflicting
ideas, would evolve.
That Kant closes “OQ” with these two points and that the same two
points are also made with even greater force in Perpetual Peace indicate
how seriously Kant meant us to take his mandate. The other aspects of
Kant’s plan in Perpetual Peace have already had a major influence on
the thinking of politicians and political philosophers in the shaping of
public policy during the intervening two centuries. Yet such attempts
have still been far from eliminating war: the century that saw the creation
of the United Nations and the institution of a whole body of internation-
al law aimed at protecting universal human rights also witnessed the most
horrifying atrocities ever committed by human beings against other
human beings throughout the whole history of humanity’s time on
earth. As technology advances, governments have become more adept at
killing off their perceived enemies and less willing to sit down with
them and dialogue until they reach the point where they can find a
way to live in peace in spite of their conflicting perspectives.
Although he acknowledges a natural purpose for war in the early
stages of human civilization, Kant argues that this initial purpose has
long since been fulfilled, rendering war unnecessary in the modern era.
Cultural differences, including differences of language and of religion,
should now be viewed in an altogether different light, as shades and
hues on the single tapestry of humanity itself. As we saw so clearly
from our review of Kant’s Conflict, these differences are not to be abol-
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ished, but highlighted, if the beautiful image of one world at peace with
itself is to become a reality. Here, as throughout his major critical writ-
ings, Kant sees conflict not as an evil to be abolished but as a preliminary
step on the road to concord. Despite its idealistic overtones, Kant seemed
to be quite serious in promoting his plan as a realistic solution to the great-
est human social problem, war. Why, then, do the conflicts we have wit-
nessed during the past centuries, and in recent years, so rarely lead to the
creative concord Kant had in mind? That is, why is war an even greater
problem today – especially given the threat from weapons of mass de-
struction – than it was in Kant’s day?
The answer suggested by “OQ” is that the world’s universities in gen-
eral, and their philosophy departments in particular, have largely failed to
realize their calling as the agents for peace in their respective societies. This
may be due in part to a lack of receptiveness on the part of governments
and/or the law schools and those trained by them to give ear to the ra-
tional arguments being put forward by philosophers. But in larger part
the responsibility lies with philosophers themselves, who in a majority
of cases are quite happy to live in the false peace of their ivory towers,
talking only with each other about the problems and issues they should
be promoting in the public square. Is it any wonder that few outside
the discipline of philosophy have listened seriously to what we philoso-
phers have been saying?
As philosophers, we must take seriously our potential role as peace-
makers by encouraging governments to adopt policies of engagement
that promote balance and mutual respect between different nations and
people groups. Although our modern universities are structured different-
ly from those in Kant’s day, with the departments of philosophy no longer
enjoying a privileged position – indeed, in some universities they no lon-
ger exist at all ! – we should still aim to practice Kant’s high ideal of peace-
ful, creative conflict. If Kant could send us any message from his resting
place in the grave, I believe it would be to remind us philosophers that we
really can help solve contemporary political problems, and that once we
realize this fact, we shall find we are closer than we ever before realized to
the day when all the nations on earth, despite their radically conflicting
perspectives, may live together in lasting peace.
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